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Over the last few decades historians have devoted attention to topics like the
commercialization of university inventions, the creation of institutional policies
regarding patents, the tensions within engineering schools between proponents of pure
research and applied engineering, and the intricate ties between institutions of higher
education, industry and government agencies.1 Although invention was a common
denominator of all these studies, none paid close attention to the academic inventor per
se. Having perhaps assumed that university professors are all scientists who teach and
do research, historians failed to appreciate the role played by the “independent inventor”
in the implementation and development of invention within university.
We think that the relative autonomy which university professors enjoy may have
drawn some independent inventors towards academia, where they were able to set up a
laboratory and invent freely. The development of engineering teaching may have also
enabled such inventors to find an institutional niche where they could pursue their work.
Furthermore, engineering schools and faculties that favored the contribution of
scientific and technological expertise to industry through consulting, tests or research
may have also attracted this kind of inventor. These conditions all came together in the
case of Jean-Charles Bernier, professor at École Polytechnique de Montréal (EPM), a
prime example of an inventor who managed to create for himself a space devoted to
invention in a university.2
Even though he did not work in private laboratories or machine shops, Bernier’s
methods and interests in inventing certainly categorize him as an example of the
independent inventor studied by Hughes.3 The only difference is that Bernier
esthablished his laboratory inside rather than outside a university. The very nature of
this institutional environment permitted him to remain free of commercial constraints.
Like most professional independent inventors, Bernier arranged his laboratory to suit
his personal agenda and surrounded himself with specialized collaborators. He did not
focus exclusively on a single invention but involved himself, rather, with a variety of
machines with widely different operational methods and applications. On the whole, his
inventions tended towards the development of radical technological systems that had the
potential of revolutionizing certain industrial sectors.4 Moreover, he did not need patent
revenues to insure his livelihood since he could rely on his professor’s salary. This
factor gave him a status closer to that of the non professional inventor. Finally,
according to Hughes entrepreneurship is one of the major characteristics of independent
3inventors. Bernier certainly possessed it but not to the degree that would ensure the
commercial success of his inventions.
Engineering Training and Research at the École Polytechnique de Montréal
In 1871, in the context of a widespread debate on the need to better adapt the
educational system to the new economic realities, Montreal’s McGill University
established the Department of Practical and Applied Science. Two years later the
Académie Commerciale Catholique de Montréal, an elementary school, added to its
curriculum a “scientific and industrial” program. In 1876, the Quebec government
transformed the program into a university-level institution that granted a diplôme
d'ingénieur. The new school was given the prestigious name of École Polytechnique de
Montréal (EPM).5
The developments of the new School and of the Engineering faculty at McGill were
widely different however. With strong support from Montreal’s mostly English
speaking upper class, McGill enjoyed a remarkable expansion at the turn of the century
and quickly gained recognition as one of North America’s most prestigious engineering
schools. Its students came not only from Quebec but from all over Canada, the United
States and the British Commonwealth. Most of its graduates found employment within
the private sector, generally in industry.6 However, EPM was far from enjoying the
favorable conditions of its English speaking counterpart. Whereas from the beginning,
McGill hired academics trained by the most prestigious American and British
universities7, EPM had to make do with self-taught ones. Without contacts in industrial
centers, the institution produced engineers who found employment mainly in
departments of public works and, to a lesser degree, as engineering consultants.8
As late as the 1920s, EPM had difficulties gaining recognition as a full-fledged
engineering school. A letter sent by Archibald Byron Macallum, then Chairman of the
National Research Council (NRC), to Prime Minister of Quebec, Lomer Gouin, paints a
rather bleak picture of the training provided by EPM.
The courses of training given in the Ecole Polytechnique does not qualify adequately
students . . . as the corresponding courses in McGill and Toronto do. . . . The curriculum, as
it appears on paper, is not appreciably inadequate, but the instruction given, the laboratory
accommodation, and the equipment in apparatus, are not such as to meet the full
requirements of the curriculum . . . the result is that students are not fully trained as
compared with those of McGill and Toronto.
 The explanation is that the Ecole Polytechnique is attempting to work with resources that
are utterly inadequate. . . . The consequences are, the staff is undermined, salaries are low
and a considerable number of teachers give only part of their time to the institution.9
Immediately after the First World War, in an effort to increase EPM’s prestige, its
administrators set about bringing the school up to par. A program revision committee
was appointed to initiate reform. The objective was not to implement a research
program however. At the end of the 1930s, neither the School’s financial situation nor
the philosophy of its directors allowed for a development in this direction. The lack of
properly trained specialists among the teaching staff kept the institution from
developing curricula in the various branches of engineering and, thereby, limited it to
general training in civil engineering. Special circumstances, such as those surrounding
4the Second World War, would have to occur before the governing body became
convinced of the necessity to invest in research to improve EPM’s standing as an
institution of higher learning. They would also provide the incentive to develop four
new specialties.
Second World War in fact created profound changes in the over all situation. The
Federal Government required scientists and engineers to contribute directly to the war
effort through increased industrial production. Research became a national priority and
organizations, such as the NRC and the Defense Research Board (DRB), took-on an
expanding role in the development of university research.10 At EPM, the aftermath of
the conflict in Europe led to the hiring of Georges Welter from Luxembourg. After
having obtained his Ph.D. at the Technische Hochchule Berlin-Charlottenburg under the
direction of O. Kammerer and having subsequently worked in German industry, he
established the institute of metallurgy and metallography at the Warsaw Polytechnical
School. When he arrived in Montreal in 1941, he already enjoyed international
recognition as one of the leading researchers in his field. At EPM. he established the
Laboratoire de résistance des matériaux and spent his first few years developing it. Not
only would Welter introduce and legitimize research practices at EPM, but he would
also, through out the 1950s and 1960s, contribute to its reproduction by training new
researchers who would themselves contribute to the institutionalization of research a
decade later.11
The post-war era favored the establishment of an institutional structure to manage the
contracting out of research to industry and public agencies. It must be noted that both
EPM’s ranking among institutions of higher education and the position of francophone
engineers’ within the social hierarchy ultimately depended on the links graduates
maintained with industry. This explains why such ties have always been a crucial stake
for EPM’s administrators. As early as 1943, Chairman Armand Circé strongly asserted
that “fostering ties with industry” is as much a part of the professor’s duty as are
teaching and research.12 T ree years later, by creating the Centre de recherches, the
Board clearly demonstrated its interest for industrial research and, by the same token,
for invention.13 Professors were encouraged to “develop processes or original ideas with
a potential for patents.”14 Towards the end of the 1940s, however, the new Chairman of
the School, Augustin Frigon, stated that in view of limited resources professors must
concentrate on pursuing projects which “are primarily applications of science and
technology”.15 Through out the 1950s and 1960s, the Centre de recherches furnished an
institutional environment favorable to the development of independent inventors’
activities. The period surrounding Second World War, with its steady growth of
research and its valorization of invention, thus saw the implementation of an
institutional context favorable to the rise and development of the activities of an
independent inventor.
Emergence of an Independent Inventor
In the Montreal of the early 1920s, commercial radio was a widely popular media,
both for its entertainment value and the easily accessible technology on which it was
based.16 Coupled with the presence of a francophone engineering school, which
attracted telecommunication enthusiasts, it became a catalyst for Jean Charles Bernier’s
career. Bernier’s passion for radio can be traced to his adolescence when the progress of
5wireless and radio transmission captivated his imagination. At the age of sixteen, he
built his first receptor-transmitter with which he was able to communicate as far as
Australia. Upon graduating from high school, he had already made a respectable amount
of money by working as a radio operator on bootlegging ships. In 1925, the nineteen-
year-old registered at EPM. During his university years, he worked for Marconi and
then as a radio operator for the Canadian Merchant Marine. Having obtained his
engineering degree in 1929, he joined the municipal road-signs division at Northern
Electric, which he later left to return to EPM where he found support to pursue his radio
interest.
Augustin Frigon17, chairman of EPM, and Professor J.-Arthur Villeneuve, MIT
graduate who had studied under the direction of Vannevar Bush, both shared Bernier’s
passion for telegraphy and radio.18 Thanks largely due to Frigon’s recommendations,
Bernier obtained a NRC grant to work on synchronous machines.19 Although seemingly
engaged in a research process, he displayed far more interest and capability for
invention. His superiors readily acknowledged that technical talents were his
trademarks. In a letter to the NRC Chairman, Frigon wrote, “I do not think that he has
much of the ‘mathematical mind’ but he certainly has a well balanced ‘mechanical
mind’.”20 Villeneuve, the project director, added that “he has not neglected the
theoretical part of his work”, but he has however “shown much skill in the designing of
the mechanical features.”21 Such comments clearly indicated that Bernier’s qualities
were, from the onset, much closer to those of an inventor than those of a researcher.
After a year’s work on synchronous machines, Bernier was awarded a second NRC
grant for the theoretical and experimental study of electronic saturation and its
applications to thermoelectric filters. He would, however, abandon this work, begun
during the 1930-31 academic year, in order to concentrate on a topic more in tune with
his experimental capacities and his passion for electromechanics. After publishing his
results in December 193022, Bernier launched himself into the television adventure. This
did not fail to arouse a response from administrators of the NRC grant program. Instead
of the expected report on electronic saturation, he described a series of experiments on
various mechanical methods of image sweeping in television. This despite the fact that
NRC rules clearly stated that, “the substitution of a report on a subsequent investigation
in lieu of work actually carried out under a scholarship should not be permitted.”23 The
young Bernier chose to ignore NRC regulations. The granting agency might have failed
to foster his abilities as a researcher, but he was now free to pursue his inventive
activities.
In the early 1930s, it was television’s turn to generate widespread curiosity within
the general population and strong enthusiasm on the part of independent inventors and
industrial researchers.24 Keeping a close watch on new developments in the field of
telecommunications, Bernier was well aware of ongoing experiments worldwide.
Fascinated by image transmission, he easily convinced a fellow EPM graduate, Fernand
Leblanc, to collaborate on a series of television experiments.25 The team worked
unhindered by the constraints that would have been imposed by a project director or a
granting organization. They purchased parts and supplies with their own monies, and
EPM provided them with a locale. There they built television systems using any
available supplies.
6Between 1931 and 1934, the two colleagues concentrated specifically on image
transmission through mechanical means.26 Fou ded on the optical properties of light,
the underlying paradigm had been uncovered during the last two decades of the
nineteenth century and brought to maturity by the sweeping process invented by
Germany’s Paul Nipkow. In 1925, Charles Francis Jenkins, in Boston, and John Logie
Baird, in London, introduced television to the general public. That same year, Bell
Laboratories engineers finalized the flying spot technique and thereby gave a second
impetus to research in the field. Between 1928 and 1933, the mechanical paradigm was
so widely accepted that it overshadowed the path put forth by Russia’s Boris Rosing in
1907: the use of Ferdinand von Braun’s cathode-ray tube based on the magnetic
properties of electrons. In 1912, this same technology led Campbell Swinton to present
a complete, albeit theoretical, system of electronic television. In 1923, Vladimir
Zworykin, a former student of Rosing and Swinton’s lecturer, demonstrated to
Westinghouse administrators his own television system, the Iconoscope.27 Five years
later he refocused his research on electronic television, this time at the Radio
Corporation of America (RCA). An independent inventor, Philo Farnsworth, followed
him closely and competed with the RCA system using his “image dissector”. Thus, in
the early 1930s, the electronic paradigm was clearly on the rise but had yet to
demonstrate its superiority over its mechanical counterpart.
In 1933, Bernier and Leblanc built two apparatuses which were clearly based on the
mechanical paradigm but which used two distinct trajectories. One was inspired by
Nipkow’s works, and the other by Bell laboratories’ flying spot technique. Later they
foresaw the possibility of a third much improved apparatus based on a brand new
process patented by Bernier.28 As any inventor working on television, Bernier was faced
with an important reverse salient, that of image resolution. The emerging industry was
indeed confronted with a major difficulty in its efforts to go beyond the experimental
stage, that of producing a high definition image. Under the name of “systè
coordonné”, Bernier’s invention improved definition by multiplying by two the
resolution of the mechanical system. To produce the flying spot, he replaced the single
light behind Nipkow’s wheel by two lights at a 90 angle to the center of the disk. This
generated a horizontal and vertical crossing effect. Consequently, instead of producing a
series of rather crude horizontal lines as did other mechanical processes, Bernier’s
technique displayed a mosaic of small detailed squares generated by two crisscrossing
beams.
In 1934, a year after Bernier had applied for patent, Zworykin and Farnsworth staged
separate public demonstrations of a revolutionary electronic television. Their invention
increasingly forced inventors and researchers to abandon the mechanical paradigm since
the new system had succeeded in improving image resolution quality threefold.
Compared to the 180 definition lines of mechanical television, it offered an impressive
560 lines (hence the name, “high definition”.) This meant that competition was no
longer between the mechanical and the electronic paradigms, but between Zworykin’s
and Farnsworth’s trajectories.
This revolution had a profound impact on Bernier’s technological imagination.
Turning his back on the mechanical paradigm, from then on he would devote his
interests to electronic technologies. As a direct consequence of his work on television,
he was hired as a professor at EPM where the Laboratoire d’électronique appliquée
(LEA) was set-up in 1937.29 There he pursued studies on photo-electronic cells, on the
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projects on electronic television, which made him among the first to explore the field in
Canada. His various other inventions such as the Servomec, the Lectron and the Berfax
incorporated the basic technologies used in the television industry.
The University Based Inventor
Invention, according to Hughes, can be defined as the resolution of new problems.30
Thus, contrary to the popular image of the heroic inventor, we now know that inventors
rely upon the development of problem solving techniques. These techniques shape the
laboratories, workshops and production units where scientists, engineers, mechanics and
craftsmen resolve specific problems. This led Hughes to state that the way in which
inventors choose their invention problems is one of the characteristics that differentiates
them among fellow inventors.31 In Jean-Charles Bernier’s case, his laboratory provides
numerous clues of his working methods as well as of the specificity of invention in a
university setting.
Bernier’s office was filled not only with documents, sketches and notes but also with
specialized journals and patent documents. Next door, in a workroom where they spent
most of their time between 1940 and 1950, assistants were busy resolving technical
problems. This room contained drawing tables, instruments for electronic measurements
and various mechanical and electronical instruments. A third room was a workshop
where mechanics provided the inventor and his team with technical support. The
organization of the laboratory made it possible to quickly give life to ideas that dealt
with electronics or electromechanics.
The laboratory also included a space devoted to teaching. EPM students could
witness practical experiments to familiarize themselves with elements of electricity,
electronics and electromechanics. This room was next to the one devoted to invention
and thus permitted free circulation between those two worlds. In Bernier’s mind,
teaching and “research” were two different entities however, and the laboratory’s
practical organization reflected this point of view. He hired additional staff to deal with
teaching related tasks while his assistants could devote themselves to their inventive
work. A technician was hired, for instance, for the preparation of pedagogical
experiments. Bernier himself taught classes ranging from mechanical physics to
electronics applied to communications. One year after the end of the war, he became the
Chairman of the Physics and Electronics Department. The university based inventor had
indeed fulfilled his teaching mandate, but he always strove to minimize its effect on his
laboratory activities.
The LEA was equipped with all the apparatuses, instruments and tools required by
the inventor’s field of interests.32 Bernier was determined to have access to the latest
electronic equipment. Deeply affected by the technological revolution of the televisual
field, he chose to specialize the laboratory in the production of tubes, which were, at the
time, the basic component of electronics.33 He immediately undertook the construction
of two glass blowing lathes, fitted with a gas source for flame beaks. In addition, he
built three high-tension generators which fed cathode tubes used in experiments.
Symmetrical linear oscillators completed the equipment. Later, the team worked on
making elevated vacuum pumps which had became indispensable for tube production.34
8All this allowed him to envision making his laboratory one of most advanced in the
field of electronics in Canada.
Bernier’s interests were diverse. In the 1940s, he invented a high frequency wood-
dryer, an electric arc for spectrographic analysis called the Polyarc and various elevated
vacuum pumps. After Second World War, he worked on the Servomec, an automated
material cutting apparatus. During the 1950s and 1960s, he focused on the Lectron and
the Rectron, two magnetic audio and video band reading and recording machines, as
well as on the Graphax, the Perspix, the Iconac and the Véricon, all instruments for
tridimensional representation. Finally, he chose the Berfax, an electromechanical
reproduction process, to win public recognition as an inventive genius. He also invested
time and effort in a few more projects, such as the Maxifax, the Minifax, the
Telesphore, the Exto-B, the Tocatron and a vibrating visual machine intended for the
blind. Bernier kept individual and detailed notes on the progress of all his inventions.
This practice, common to most inventor, not only allowed him to keep track of his
inventions but also protected him in case of patent litigation.
As most independent inventors, Bernier was surrounded with collaborators and
mechanics. They contributed to his work and resolved various problems on both the
conceptual and practical level. Because of his concentration on inventive activities,
however Bernier never perceived the growing importance of graduate studies in
engineering training. None of his assistants, who were mostly students, went on to
pursue inventing as a career. They usually preferred to engage in teaching, school
administration or scientific research. Training specialists had never been one of
Bernier’s main interest. Most of his efforts, rather, tended towards limiting the impact
of teaching activities on his workload. He never strove to hand-down work methods or
to develop in his students the abilities that characterize an inventor. This was despite the
fact that graduate training and the diffusion of research methods were by then important
stakes at EPM, and several of his assistants were well aware of that. One of his main
assistants, Roger P. Langlois who worked at EPM between 1947 and 1963, sought
specialization at MIT at the Master’s level. Upon his return in 1953, he went back to the
LEA but left ten years later to contribute to the reform of Quebec’s school system. Back
once again at EPM in 1969, he worked at strenghtening research .35
Bernier’s activities differed in several aspects from that of a university researcher.
Because they work in a university laboratory and use scientific knowledge in their
inventive activities, inventors working in academic settings may justly view themselves
as researchers. By the same token, some researchers may consider themselves as
inventors because they secure patents and collaborate with industry. We must look
beneath the surface of such activities, however, to see the difference between a
university researcher and an inventor like Bernier. From a sociological point of view,
Bernier’s practices were not the same as those of university researcher because he did
not belong to a scientific field and thus was not familiar with disciplinary stakes.36
Without a Ph.D,  he did not internalized the common practices of researcher.37  His
basic motivation was to invent and obtain patents as a means of recognition. Unlike
university researchers, he had limited concern for the dissemination of knowledge
through scientific journals, and only published a few articles throughout his career,
mostly in periodicals outside scholarly fields.38 F nally, although he did obtain grants
from funding agencies to finance his research work, this was but an occasional
occurrence as he had notable difficulties meeting the criteria of such agencies.  Instead,
9he relied upon his personnal ressources and, after 1940s, upon the Centre de recherche
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 Despite such practices, Bernier contributed to the development of a discourse on
research by presenting invention as a crucial aspect of this activity.39 From the very
beginning, he upheld the classical distinction between “fundamental” and “applied”
research in order to bring to invention the prestige of “science”. In his view, if
“fundamental research” produces new scientific knowledge, then the role of “applied
research” is to “innovate, invent and develop new products, new processes and to insure
the sustained improvement of existing techniques as well as the creation of new ones.”40
For him, the fundamental function of research is, without doubt, the promotion of the
economic development and industry.41 To fulfill their role as agents of economic
development, he stressed that universities needed laboratories, equipment and skilled
labor. He suggested that institutions should emulate major corporations, like General
Electric, which had successfully developed inventive activities within their laboratories.
In his view, if such industries managed to finance themselves by commercializing
products protected by patents, universities should also be able to fulfill at least part of
their research-funding needs in this way.
Through his professional involvement, Bernier in fact played an active role in the
institutionalization of inventive activities. Appointed Chairman of the Centre de
recherches in 1953, he used his power to change some of the rules governing the
institution in order to better promote invention. Within two years, he tabled a report in
which he justified the abolition of a number of institutional constraints upon research
activities that did not fit normal academic standards.42 He went on to suggest changes to
the Centre’s funding elegibility criteria to take into consideration projects whose
success had usually been deemed doubtful. This proposal met with a strong negative
reaction from colleagues who had been socialized through research practices and who
were unwilling to accept all but the commonly recognized criteria of the scientific
community.43 Lastly, he attempted to have patents acknowledged as an indicator of a
professor’s scientific and technological productivity. He insisted that the Centre de
recherches must not only continue to encourage invention but also get involved in the
process of filling for patents. Although Bernier did not turn the Centre de recherches
into a structure capable of promoting his inventions at the commercial level, as had been
the case at MIT or at the University of Wisconsin44, his view on research and invention
had lasting repercussions within the institution. We shall now examine how he
attempted to commercialize his inventions within the university setting.
A University-Based Inventor-Entrepreneur
In 1958, EPM moved on the campus of the University of Montreal and allowed
Bernier to expand his laboratory.45 Due to the abolition of the teaching section, notably,
the LEA became more suitable to the organization of his inventive work. His assistants
were now more specialized in a work organization that was increasingly hierarchical.
The laboratory employed around ten collaborators, in addition to mechanics and a
secretary. Bernier could therefore delegate specific tasks to his aids who worked in the
new rooms: the mechanical workshop, the vacuum tube room, the small chemistry lab,
the electromechanic workshop and the Berfax’s room. In terms of organization, this
second laboratory was not like those of large corporations — it was a university
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inventor’s laboratory.46 So neither his laboratory nor the university had, for example, an
office for technology transfer, for commercialization or for patent filling. Bernier’s
freedom was high, but his sensitivity to the needs of industry was, consequently, low.
As previously noted, entrepreneurship is, according to Hughes, one of the
characteristics of the independent inventor.47 As a general rule, whenever inventors
acquire a patent, they try to collect on their work by commercializing their invention.
They face major difficulties in academic settings. The commercialization of patented
products does not lie within the mandate of the university, for instance. After having
invented the Lectron, the Graphax and the Berfax between 1958 and 1966, Bernier had
to seek partners outside the academic world in order to succeed in marketing his
inventions. In many ways, his tribulations in the world of business were not far removed
from those encountered in present day technology spin-offs from universities.48
In 1958, along with two collaborators, Bernier invented the Lectron. He immediately
saw its patenting potential and, that same year, contacted the Canadian Patent and
Development Limited (CPDL), an NRC company. This company was designed to
promote the commercialization of patents obtained by federal civil servants. As noted
by the historian Wilfrid Eggleston, “The new arrangements also offered Canadian
Universities a service whereby a channel was provided through which the scientific
work of university staffs could be utilized by industry.”49 In vi tue of this, CPDL made
contractual agreements with Canadian universities to commercialize patents obtained by
professors. The inventor in no way relinquished his rights since the standard contract
included a clause stating that “the term ‘University Inventor’ means a person in the
employ of or otherwise connected with the University who has agreed to assign any
patentable developments to the University and who has made an invention.”50 This
suggests that Bernier’s case was far from unique. But Bernier’s unwillingness to
cooperate with the CPDL shows that its system of marketing inventions was inadequate.
In 1958, Bernier investigated the terms which bound EPM to CPDL. Having examined
all the implications, he quickly reached the conclusion that these conditions did not suit
him. He did try to renegotiate the accord but CPDL firmly refused to alter the nature of
its ties with EPM.51
Bernier then turned to another alternative, industry. In 1960, the Institute of Radio
Engineers invited him to its convention on electronic communication. His presentation
brought him a certain measure of visibility within the industry.52 He seized the
opportunity to unveil the potential of his invention to RCA, Northern Electric and
Canadian Marconi researchers and engineers. In view of the interest shown by these
industrialists for the Lectron, Bernier decided to take legal steps to insure his rights.53
The conference also served to enhance the prestige of the LEA and EPM. In 1961, over
fifty major companies, including Ampex, International Business Machines, Minnesota
Milling and Manufacturing (3M), General Electric and Telechrome Manufacturing,
requested additional information on the Lectron. RCA, in its eagerness to acquire a
promising invention, sent a delegation of high ranking research administrators to the
LEA to “discuss the head [the Lectron] and to determine whether you [Bernier] have
made any inventions in your development which may be of interest to us”.54 Although
an agreement was never reached, such meetings provided the opportunity to establish
contacts with corporations.
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Correspondence between Bernier and industrial leaders reveal a lot on his attitude
towards innovation. Bernier did not spontaneously perceive himself as an entrepreneur.
Thus, when Frank C. Bumb, vice-president of American Concertone, inquired about the
steps he had undertaken to commercialize the Lectron, Bernier acknowledged his
inability to move forward on this aspect, mainly because of his institutional affiliation.
In his answer to Bumbs he wrote, “As an educational institution we are very well
equipped in research facilities, but the industrial and commercial promotion of such a
device is somewhat out of our line.”55 At EPM, the CPDL was the only resource
accessible to the academic inventor wishing to commercialize an invention. This largely
explains why the Lectron never reach developmental stage, despite the fact that work on
the invention continued until the late 1960s.
The Bermont-Électromécanique Company case was another defeat for the inventor.
In the late 1950s, Bernier invented a tridimensional axonometric representational
instrument, the Graphax.56 In 1963, he published a technical description in the journals
Design Engineering and Graphic Science.57 This generated an impressive quantity of
mail from engineers working for major American corporations, such as Cincinnati
Milling Machine and Good Year Aerospace, inquiring about his commercial intentions
for the product. Surprised by the enthusiasm for his invention, Bernier gave serious
consideration to the possibility of manufacturing and marketing it himself.58
Overcoming his former reluctance to go into business, he established the Bermont-
Électromécanique Company. He must soon had to acknowledge, however, that his
expectations were unrealistic. Instead of the 1 350 instruments which he had projected
to sell annually59, he only sold a few over several years.
In 1967, while his company fell far short of producing the expected results, a 3M
representative contacted him, offering to evaluate the commercial value of the Graphax
at the company’s facility in Saint Paul, Minnesota. This offer gave Bernier new hope
and he spared no efforts to prepare the presentation. The results were very
disappointing, however. The Graphax was deemed all but useless in the Company’s
eyes. “It is our opinion”, wrote one representative of 3M, “that the demand for
axonometric drawings produced by orthographic views is very limited and we have
decided not to pursue the matter any further.”60 This signaled the end of the Graphax
and of Bermont-Électromécanique.
To fully understand the difficulties of marketing inventions generated in a university
setting, we must still examine an another attemp of Bernier to market his invention. In
the 1960s, the LEA team succeeded in perfecting an image reproduction process on
which it had worked for over ten years. The expectation was that it would revolutionize
graphic reproduction techniques. Bernier therefore undertook patenting procedures to
protect the new “Berfax”. However, the process was ridden with technical and legal
difficulties and that prevented it from ever succeeding. The American patent office
found at least fifteen interferences which Bernier’s lawyers were unable to justify.61
Bernier was forced to seek financial support from EPM. Among the reasons he invoked
to obtain the needed funds, he did not hesitate to present the patent as a means of
gaining public recognition for inventive activity and, thereby, of strengthening the
public image of the School.
To establish our property rights and the rights over ‘inventions’ which [result from efforts
in ‘applied science’], it is essential to protect them through patents. In addition to their
potential commercial value, these patents carry an indisputable advertisement value for their
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author and the institution because they constitute a certificate of originality (something like a
mining claim!).62
In 1966, the Berfax was presented to the general public during a widely publicized
press conference that attracted the interest of industrial circles. Intrigued by the
promises held by the reproduction process, business and public services representatives
established contacts with the EPM professor.63 Four years later, James Keane, an
engineer at Aviation Electric, succeeded in convincing him to enter into partnership for
the manufacture and sale of the device.64 Kean  also had a business degree from the
London County College of Commerce. His role in the establishment of the Berfax
Corporation was crucial.
With two new partners, Walter Haggerty and especially Robert L. Slater, a consultant
for major companies in the field of photo-reproduction, the Berfax Corporation became
in 1973 a public corporation with headquarters on Wall Street.65 Share holders managed
to acquire a capital of US $35,000 and to obtain an additional US $166,000 loan from
the New York Bank. It had a Canadian subsidiary, Berfax Ltd., to which the federal and
provincial governments granted close to Can $630,000. The new partners thus rapidly
provided the Corporation with considerable recognition. Their objective was to become
a major player in the reproduction market, which includes competitors in the
lithographic, photographic (Kodak) and xerographic (Xerox and 3M) industries.66 The
business plan projected a net worth of US $10 million for 1979.67 A major obstacle
hindered the project, however. The patent was still pending, and this jeopardized the
future of the company.68 The Berfax Corporation folded by the end of the 1970s and
few factors beyond the patenting failure help to explain the demise of the spin-off
company. The economic and technological risks were not greater than what any new
company usually meet.
Although EPM did use the Centre de recherches to promote the contributions made
by its professors to scientific and technological development, it failed to provide them
with the resources and structures required to facilitate the transfer of technologies and
the management of patents. To launch his inventions beyond the university, Bernier
learnt basic marketing techniques and negotiated almost singlehandedly with business
representatives and lawyers. Under such conditions, his inventions had a far more
limited chance of success than if they had been developed in an industrial institution.
They lacked the indispensable support of a legal department capable of influencing
research programs on the basis of existing patents, marketing administrators able to
assess commercial potential and technicians able to operate the transfer of technology
from the laboratory to the production chain.
Conclusion
Between 1937 and 1971, an independent inventor occupied a central position at
École Polytechnique de Montréal. His wide range of activities is a testimony to the fact
that such an individual can be productive in an academic institution. The creation of a
laboratory in electronics, the development of a team of collaborators, mechanics and
technicians, the production of numerous inventions, the patent applications and the
establishment of companies constitute the many achievements of a life-long
undertaking.
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As an independant inventor, Bernier had specific reactions to the opportunities and
constraints provided by his institutional affiliation. In the context of burgeoning and
developing research at EPM, Bernier was able to promote invention as an integral part
of “applied research”, and thereby assist the EPM Board in increasing the visibility of
the institution and in generating new links with industry. When he became Chairman of
the Centre de recherches in 1953, Bernier not only provided invention with legitimacy
but was also influential in providing it with better institutional conditions.
He did, however, meet with important difficulties in commercializing his inventions.
Marketing failures of the Lectron, the Graphax and the Berfax bear witness to the fact
that the university milieu often fails to provide favorable conditions for the
commercialization of inventions made in its laboratories. In Bernier’s case, the relative
isolation of EPM from industrial circles and the limited interest of its administration in
providing capital and in establishing structures suitable for technology transfer might
explain why the inventor-entrepreneur had to go outside the institution's structure to
find he expertise to commercialize his inventions.
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